The Seme–Mile 2 international corridor, a critical westward trade route linking Lagos with Benin and other West African states, has long promised seamless regional integration in line with ECOWAS principles. Instead, it has become a focal point for delays, multiple checkpoints, and allegations of extortion, hampering trade and tarnishing Nigeria’s regional image.

Despite ECOWAS provisions for free movement and efforts by governments to modernise border operations, the Lagos–Badagry–Seme corridor remains tangled in overlapping security mandates, unofficial toll points, and governance gaps. Stakeholders argue that this dysfunction undermines trade facilitation, inflates costs for importers and exporters, and jeopardises Nigeria’s leadership role in West African economic diplomacy.

Context and Significance

Stretching from the Mile 2 interchange in Lagos through Agbara and Badagry to the Seme border, the corridor serves as a lifeline for goods, petroleum products, commuters, and travellers across ECOWAS.

The route was envisioned as a model of regional cooperation under the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services (1979), which aimed to promote seamless trade and integration. But instead of smooth mobility, the corridor has become notorious for gridlocks, decaying infrastructure, and a proliferation of checkpoints operated by agencies such as the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Police, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigerian Army, Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), and sometimes the NDLEA.

Reported Challenges and Dynamics

Official vs. Unofficial Checkpoints:
While authorities insist that only a few checkpoints are legitimate, road users often encounter dozens of stops—sometimes less than a kilometre apart. The stretch feels more like a toll zone than a regulated border route.

Extortion and Delays:
Commercial drivers and travellers frequently report being stopped for “routine checks” that seem to have little to do with actual security needs. Many of these encounters end in monetary demands, suggesting that personal gain often overshadows the public interest.

Historical Trends:
Reform efforts in the early 2000s aimed to align Nigeria’s practices with ECOWAS free movement principles, but by the mid-2010s, new checkpoints emerged—many allegedly controlled by local power brokers or rogue enforcement units.

Border Modernisation:
Despite investments in joint border posts and modernisation programs, the Nigerian section remains plagued by poor coordination, undermining progress made on the Beninese side.

Governance and Accountability Implications

Fragmented Authority:
The corridor suffers from overlapping mandates among the ministries of Police Affairs, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Defence, resulting in confusion and inefficiency.

Non-State Actors:
Reports indicate that traditional rulers and community heads sometimes operate informal checkpoints, treating the route as a private revenue source and further eroding public trust.

Economic and Reputational Costs:
The ripple effects are severe—higher transport costs, inflated prices of goods, and Nigeria’s diminished credibility within ECOWAS as a trade facilitator.

Key Quotes and Statements

Comptroller Adewale Adenuga, head of the Seme Area Command of the Nigeria Customs Service, has warned that many of the checkpoints are unauthorised and hinder seamless trade. He maintains that only two official checkpoints—Agbara and Gbaji—are approved.

In recent stakeholder meetings, Adenuga described the abundance of checkpoints along the Badagry axis as a “major obstacle to trade,” emphasising that most should not exist in the first place.

Road users, however, argue that uncoordinated police and military units continue to mount barriers, often without oversight or clear accountability.

Policy Recommendations and Calls to Action

1. Dismantle Illegal Checkpoints:
   Enforce the two-official-checkpoint policy and prosecute officers or civilians who create unauthorised stops.

2. Strengthen Inter-Ministerial Coordination:
   Create a unified corridor management framework involving Police Affairs, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Defence.

3. Improve Accountability:
   Establish transparent monitoring systems for patrol and monitoring units to prevent misuse of authority.

4. Restore Regional Leadership:
   Use the corridor as a litmus test for Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS ideals by ensuring transparency and predictability in trade operations.

Impact on Stakeholders

• Traders and Importers Face inflated logistics costs due to delays and unofficial payments, reducing Nigeria’s competitiveness.

• Transport Operators and Commuters: Endure long travel times, harassment, and unpredictable road conditions.

• Government and ECOWAS Partners: Struggle to reconcile Nigeria’s leadership rhetoric with the reality of dysfunctional border governance.

The Seme–Mile 2 corridor remains one of West Africa’s most strategic trade arteries—but it has also become a symbol of corruption and institutional weakness. Restoring its promise requires decisive, coordinated reform: dismantling illegal checkpoints, clarifying agency roles, and enforcing accountability. Only then can the corridor shift from a corridor of corruption to a pathway of progress—and Nigeria reclaim its role as a true leader in West African integration.